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In common with other educated observers in the interwar period, Antonio Gramsci believed he was living through an epochal transformation of modern cultural and political life. This, in his view, amounted to a wholesale breach with the liberal-capitalist order that had held sway over much of Western Europe since the late nineteenth century. The social organisation of human freedom and solidarity was now being substantially recast. Italy’s circumstances represented only a particular variant of the wider crisis of parliamentary politics and the elite values and practices that supported them. In the wake of the devastations of World War I, the ongoing concentration of industrial capitalism and the emergent ‘mass’ politics that attended it, the institutional architecture and ideological rationale of liberal societies were utterly exhausted. The time was ripe, he believed, for a new ruling class to take power alongside a new model of freedom.​[1]​ 

Gramsci’s political writings can be read, at least in part, as a running commentary on the evolving dimensions of that crisis and the opportunities it afforded a socialist intervention.​[2]​ An informed revolutionary politics, he believed, had to insert itself into the prevailing currents of social change, not be imposed arbitrarily. Yet, if Gramsci affirmed the necessity to break with the past, he soon appreciated the difficulty of making such a break. His prison writings, in particular, exhibit a unique sensitivity to the situation of sustained hiatus between what he called a ‘dying’ old order and a new one ‘that cannot be born’.​[3]​ To understand the general thrust and development of Gramsci’s thought, I want to argue, it helps to view it against the background assumption of a terminal liberal order whose ‘morbid symptoms’, as he called them, obstructed the path to social and political rebirth.

Although no liberal himself, Gramsci’s thought evolved in an environment substantially shaped by liberal aspirations and achievements. Unsurprisingly, then, he borrowed terms peculiar to the Italian liberal tradition to define his frame of reference: ‘hegemony’, ‘force and consent’, ‘national-popular’, or ‘state and civil society’, for example.​[4]​ Partly for this reason, throughout the 1960s and 70s, both sympathisers and critics viewed Gramsci as a rather liberal-minded Marxist: for instance, in emphasising bourgeois western conditions over those of the authoritarian ‘East’, civil society over the state, consent over coercion, subjectivity over scientific objectivism, or an inclusive popular politics rather than strict, Leninist vanguardism.​[5]​ Of course, liberalism has numerous, overlapping meanings. It is simultaneously a political philosophy, an ideology, a social theory, even a ‘technology’ of government.​[6]​ For Gramsci, it was primarily an ideological and political movement promoting individual freedom as the unifying principle of the nation-state. As a socialist critic he understood that ideology to be the bourgeoisie’s self-image writ-large, with limited extension to other social classes. In that respect he has little new to say about the meaning and application of liberal arguments and ideas, which he believed to be anachronistic. Yet Gramsci understood the cultural and historical efficacy of liberalism and recognised a need to think revolution partly in its language. There is, therefore, a degree of ambivalence in Gramsci’s attitude: on the one hand, liberalism was an exhausted phenomenon ready to be supplanted and yet, on the other, he acknowledged – both explicitly and implicitly – its role in shaping the terrain upon which any new order might be built. That ambivalence, which ties Gramsci’s reasoning to the specific circumstances of a collapsing liberal order, both enables and qualifies how his insights might be recruited today.​[7]​ 

In what follows, I sketch the crisis of the liberal order that supplies the immediate backdrop to Gramsci’s thought. I explore the way he responded directly to the failings of liberal politics by imagining a worker’s state in the factories, which would replace parliamentary institutions and install a new ruling class.  The imperative to renew the state and its leaders was common among liberals, too, and I will note how Gramsci’s ideas found admiration from the ‘revolutionary liberal’, Piero Gobetti. Later, in his prison writings, Gramsci expanded his analysis of the crisis of the state, drawing inspiration from liberals such as Benedetto Croce to elaborate his theory of hegemony. Marxism, he even claimed, was the principal beneficiary of liberalism’s historical role as a state-building project founded upon a principle of freedom. Likewise, bourgeois history confirmed that a party was the best vehicle to generate this state. I conclude by suggesting that, although his preoccupations distance him from us, Gramsci’s ambivalence towards liberalism nonetheless remains instructive in a period of crisis under conditions of ‘neo-liberal’ hegemony.

Death of the Old: Italian Liberalism in Crisis

Gramsci emerged as a figure on the radical left as Italy’s political institutions stumbled in the wake of the World War I.  Liberalism, he argued, was destroyed by a mass politics it could no longer neutralise. Notoriously bereft of popular endorsement, nonetheless liberal ideals had exercised a profound influence over generations of Italian intellectuals. The unification of the state in 1861 (completed only in 1870), following the battles of the Risorgimento, constituted the primary historical and cultural point of reference for generations of Italians, supplying them with national ‘heroes’ (Cavour, Garibaldi, and Mazzini), events and dates (for example, the 20th September). Liberalism may have had limited reach as a public philosophy but its association with modernity, progress, national unity, liberation from tyranny, and constitutional government remained powerful among educated classes. Indeed, the disappointment that many expressed at the impoverished reality of ‘Liberal Italy’ (that is, the post-unification constitutional monarchy), in contrast to the ideals proclaimed in its name, reflected a substantial, lingering admiration for those ideals.​[8]​ 

What, then, had happened to Liberal Italy? Historians have pointed to the widespread difficulties liberalism suffered in extending its influence over an unevenly developed society.​[9]​ For example: the absence of a large middle class in a predominantly agrarian economy, a minimal culture of entrepreneurialism and, instead, a reliance on foreign capital and state-funded industries; an overbearing state distrustful of its citizens – mostly poor peasants who held it in contempt – and reliant upon force and guile, not willing consent, to maintain control; a hostile Catholic church unwilling to reconcile to a temporal power, let alone a liberal one; a factious, class-divided society molded by years of suspicion and violent suppression, and the dominance of large landowners in an undeveloped, agrarian South with meagre regard for those under their charge. Moreover, with the passing of the governments of the ‘Historic Right’ in the 1880s, parliament came to be dominated by an elite disconnected from the public, undisciplined by ideology, prone to electoral corruption and being bought-off by governments for passing support in parliament (the practice of ‘transformism’). 

These conditions meant that liberalism remained primarily a guiding ideal of what, for a minority, the unified state could become rather than a tradition rooted in what it actually was. Liberal values never became a popular ideology inspiring individual self-reliance and independence from government. As indigenous political scientists such as Vilfredo Pareto or Gaetano Mosca famously presented it, parliamentary democracy was typically a struggle by elites to stay in power, not a clash of social forces looking to empower citizens.​[10]​ Indeed, in political philosophy, liberal principles were framed by a Hegelian tradition that emphasised the role of the state, not the individual, in advancing human freedom.​[11]​ Liberty was thus regularly conceived in semi-religious terms as a collective sentiment, or spirit, into which citizens were to be educated, not a natural disposition of mankind. In practice, alignment with liberalism often amounted to little more than the defensive worship of national institutions against a fractious population, not a firm or widespread commitment to liberty, equality or fraternity. How individuals, their freedoms, and society were to be reconciled remained a persistent and unresolved question.

Yet Liberal Italy survived into the twentieth century despite its evident weaknesses. This was, in part, due, to the eventual incorporation into the parliamentary system of the burgeoning northern workers’ movement whose Marxist representatives, although ostensibly hostile to the liberal order, traded their support for progressive measures. Such was the strategy pursued by the wily liberal premier, Giovanni Giolitti, and which succeeded in reducing social conflict up until the outbreak of World War I.​[12]​ The war, however, demolished the social basis of those parliamentary compromises. Neither the workers’ movement, nor the peasant organisations, Catholic representatives or conservative landowners were willing to continue compromising. Revolutions in Russia, Hungary and Germany strengthened the militancy of the workers and this, in turn, weakened the attachment of middle classes to the liberal elite. As elsewhere, the tremendous violence of the war instigated a profound sense that old social and political hierarchies had collapsed. In turn, that fed impatience across Italian society for radical renewal. Disappointment with Liberal Italy soon evolved into a clamorous struggle for its destruction.

Birth of the New: the Workers’ State

Although he was a southerner from Italy’s underdeveloped hinterland, Gramsci’s formal education was nevertheless a broadly liberal one. He learned about the events of Italian history, its military figures, and the great accomplishments of its leaders.​[13]​ When he moved from Sardinia to study in the Alpine city of Turin in 1911, Italy was celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of unity.​[14]​ Turin was a famously liberal city, with intellectual connections to France; it was the first capital of the unified state, and home to many of its political leaders such as Cavour and Giolitti. Gramsci’s professors at the university included liberals, such as the economist, Luigi Einaudi. Yet to this environment Gramsci brought the experience and attitude of an outsider, one eager to absorb the national culture but unwilling to be assimilated to it. In his early years he is reputed to have been something of a Sardinian nationalist.​[15]​

When Gramsci embraced revolutionary socialism, it was first as a cultural critic extolling the virtues of education and moral self-discipline for the working classes. His early socialism was a thoroughly intellectual creed – not a trade unionist mentality – informed by the idealism of Croce and the progressive critique of the illiberal state by Gaetano Salvemini. As a theatre critic and, later, editor of Il Grido del Popolo, the young Gramsci directed himself to radical intellectuals, liberal and socialist alike, as well as to educated working people. He therefore shared in many of the preoccupations of the liberal intelligentsia and criticised the failings of political elites from the standard of disappointed liberal ideals. The Italian state, he argued, had never been properly liberal; it had never occupied a superior ethical stance over and above class struggle and private conflicts.​[16]​ Unlike Britain and Germany, whose states endorsed principles of laissez-faire and rational authority respectively, Italy lacked any enduring principle of order. Socialism’s historic task was therefore to provide a principle of order where there was none.​[17]​ Likewise, in mobilising the masses around collective goals, only socialism brought a shared sense of liberty to Italian citizens.​[18]​ This was a ‘positive’ idea of liberty linked to the realisation of a collective purpose, which liberalism had failed to provide. The Italian state, he argued elsewhere, was ‘a despotic State.’ It lacked a free market and its parliament ‘is effectively subject to the executive power; it lacks any capacity for effective control.’​[19]​ A genuine bourgeois state, he assumed, would permit classes and groups to clash openly – but not Italy’s under Giolitti.​[20]​ Behind these criticisms lies the implicit endorsement of liberalism as an integrated social order, an image from which Italian society fell far short. Gramsci’s early socialism was conceived with this idealised image in mind. Indeed, he noted that the ‘political ideology’ of liberalism is ‘the origin of all revolutionary ideologies and the direct source of socialism.’​[21]​  Socialism was charged with bringing to fruition the rational moral and political order that properly belonged to liberalism.​[22]​

Gramsci eventually found a concrete model of socialist organisation to replace the liberal state in the industrial factories during the explosion of strikes and occupations that took place during the ‘two red years,’ 1919-20 (the so-called biennio rosso). In response to high inflation and to strict discipline inside the northern factories, the metal workers unions came out on strike. To prevent a lockout, workers occupied the factories and, by reworking former grievance committees, continued to maintain productivity during the dispute. Under the influence of syndicalist ideas from France, and buoyed by the revolutionary events in Russia and Germany, Gramsci and other young socialists disaffected with the reformist inclinations of the Socialist Party promoted the dispute as a spontaneous form of workers state. In 1919, as co-editor of the new socialist cultural review, Ordine Nuovo, Gramsci assembled ideas and arguments concerning industrial production and self-governing ‘factory councils’ as the site of a new democratic order.​[23]​ These arguments came from a variety of sources but Gramsci sought to give them a unifying, theoretical rationale.​[24]​

For Gramsci, the incipient forms of factory democracy spoke directly to the failings of the liberal state. They offered a new way to connect freedom and authority without artificially separating citizens from power or from each other, as did parliamentary systems. The bourgeois state, he argued was now in ‘the process of dissolution.’​[25]​ The productive function of the bourgeoisie had ended. Its state form – the liberal democratic parliamentary state – was properly designed to enable private competition.​[26]​ But with the onset of industrial concentration and rationalised methods of production, the economic initiative now lay with the proletariat inside the factory, not the entrepreneur outside. Here was the source of a new ruling class born from its own material experience as an ‘instrument’ of economic life. A factory-based democracy built directly upon shared practical needs, with an authentic sense of community rooted in social cooperation not competition. The factory replaced the liberal state – its productive tasks embodied the unifying goal of all workers; the liberal citizen was substituted by the ‘producer,’ with functional responsibilities to the industrial unit replacing atomistic rights and freedoms. It supplied ‘a harmonious hierarchy’ upon which a new, autonomous community could govern itself.​[27]​ Individual industrial plants would connect to each other through a system of councils overseen by a planning committee. Infusing this ‘organic’ structure of self-governing industrial communities was what Gramsci imagined as a producer mentality, a new psychology motivating individuals to identify with their particular tasks and to regard each other as elements of the whole.​[28]​ 

As Darrow Schecter points out, this organic vision owed much to the social philosophy of the Hegelian, Giovanni Gentile, who argued for an order in which individual and state were effectively inseparable.​[29]​ Likewise, Gramsci’s sketch of the factory-state spoke to a similar desire to conjoin – indeed, harmonise – public and private domains.​[30]​ As with Gentile’s vision, Gramsci’s was, undoubtedly, tendentially illiberal: unifying public and private realms gave little room for conflict and no place for organised dissent. Workers were expected to share the goal of increased production and Gramsci assumed a producer mentality would protect against any serious disagreements. It wasn’t clear, either, how the wider system of factory councils would safeguard the autonomy of individual plants if they did not align with the central production plan. Nor, finally, was it obvious how other social classes – such as the peasantry – were expected to fit into the factory system. As a political theory, then, the finer details of Gramsci’s vision are somewhat troubling.

But Gramsci’s theory of the workers state was not intended as a precise theoretical model. It responded, in part, to the faltering efforts of liberal politicians to recapture their leadership over society in the frenzy of strikes and social conflict after the war. ‘The Italian State was not liberal’ he reiterated, but now also ‘executive power is being prised away from the old system of capitalist forces: the economic substance of the Italian state is becoming fluid.’​[31]​  In the 1919 elections, the left had won the largest share of seats and the prospects for transforming society seemed, momentarily, promising. However, industrial unrest eventually ended in compromise in autumn 1920 and the initiative from the left soon gave way to intensifying reaction from the right and the rapid dissolution of liberal institutions. The Socialist Party’s failure to support the workers led, in 1921, to the communist faction (of which Gramsci was a leading member) splitting off to found the small but staunchly Leninist Communist Party. Mussolini’s fascist movement soon stepped in to benefit from widespread fear of revolution. Throughout 1921-22, up and down the country, fascist militia seized town halls and reaped violence on workers and their organisations. This so-called ‘seizure of power’ demonstrated the savagery of fascist power, the willingness of industrialists and landowners to make use of it, and the weakness of liberal institutions to control it (indeed, police and magistrates were often complicit in events).​[32]​

Erstwhile liberals soon began to reassess their alignments, with radically different conclusions. Many found the fascists’ methods distasteful but saw them as a legitimate – but temporary – reaction to the threat posed by revolutionaries. Some, like Croce, hoped that the fascists would help restore order and return authority to the status quo ante. Others, like Gentile, saw the need for a firm reaffirmation of order – later he was to become education minister in the fascist-led government and a committed supporter of fascism. Liberalism, in the view of this conservative Hegelian, was essentially an authoritarian defence of the state as the source of national freedom.​[33]​ Still others took a more radical direction. The liberal democrat, Giovanni Amendola, affirmed the need for a reconstitution of the liberal state around inclusive, democratic principles. However, in his view, this demanded the radical left first abandon its revolutionary project and accept the legitimacy of the state.​[34]​ 

Perhaps the most interesting response from a self-declared liberal, however, was that of the young graduate of Turin University, Piero Gobetti.​[35]​ Unlike other liberals, he understood fascism as the fulfilment of Italy’s failed liberal regime, not a divergence from its path. Mussolini, he claimed, was simply a continuation of Giolitti: a renewed effort to eliminate conflict from political life and restore authority by ‘collaboration’ with reactionary forces.​[36]​ Italians, he argued, had never known a properly liberal order where contrasting ideologies could battle out their differences in parliament. Instead, compromise, bribes and corruption had produced a managed consensus that eliminated genuine conflict between alternative governmental programmes. Gobetti proclaimed the need for what he called a ‘liberal revolution’ – the title of the review he established in 1922. He was well known to the Ordine Nuovo group (he had contributed theatre reviews) and greatly admired Gramsci’s ideas on workers’ autonomy.​[37]​ For him, the Turin communists represented a novel experiment in autonomy for the proletariat, an example of how a class defines its own interests through struggle and educates a new ruling class. Gobetti was deeply impressed by the factory council movement and, despite Gramsci’s avowed communist leanings, saw it as the basis for a renewal of liberal values. The Turin workers helped constitute the proletariat as a distinct class with clear interests and values. They promoted a concrete vision of freedom such had never been fully realised in Italy and which contributed to a conflictual but ultimately durable order with a rejuvenated ruling elite.​[38]​ Alongside representatives from other social classes and movements, he hoped, a popularly endorsed liberalism would be forged from the ground up, with the industrial workers taking a lead.

Of course, Gramsci had little explicit interest in reconstituting liberalism. The factory council idea was a project for a new ruling class on the basis of a distinct idea of self-government, but it wasn’t the pluralist arrangement that Gobetti imagined it to be. Nonetheless, Gramsci appreciated Gobetti’s unique effort to rethink liberalism by recognising the distinctiveness of council communism rather than – like other liberals and socialists – censuring them. As Gramsci became more involved in the Communist Party, he kept in contact with Gobetti’s review and monitored its discussion of the historical limitations of the Italian state. What increasingly preoccupied him was how best to understand the wider circumstances that had prevented a workers’ state from taking root at a moment of crisis. Like Gobetti, Gramsci came to realise that installing a ruling class was a long-term aspiration that needed to be managed strategically in light of the unevenness of Italy’s development. Political strategy had to operate across the complex fabric of civil society rather than concentrate directly on state institutions. Like the liberal, Gramsci saw that a broad coalition of sympathetic forces was required to build and lead an antifascist movement of the left. Indeed, Gramsci praised Gobetti’s appreciation of the Turin workers and his ability to conceive freedom as a collective rather than exclusively individual phenomenon.​[39]​ Unlike Gobetti, however, he saw the Communist Party as the proper means to achieve this. Under its organisational leadership, Gramsci argued from the mid-1920s, an effective revolutionary movement would cultivate support from left-leaning bourgeois ‘intellectuals’ like Gobetti. That view contrasted radically with the opinion in the Communist Third International, expressed from 1928, which remained dogmatically insistent that a revolutionary rupture in capitalism was imminent and that all connection to bourgeois parties must be eschewed.

Gramsci’s association with Gobetti is instructive because it indicates how, even as he moved more closely to Leninist principles of political organisation, he remained attentive to liberal ideas. This was possible because liberalism itself had splintered politically and intellectually. Figures like Gobetti might not be attracted to communism but it was conceivable that they support an antifascist movement to renew the state, replenish its ruling class and establish a popular ideology of freedom. Herein lies Gramsci’s ambivalence towards liberalism: he aligned himself firmly against its institutions and ideology but he conceptualised a revolutionary transition to socialism in the terms inherited, in part, from the liberal tradition. This historical outlook was occasioned by the prolonged situation of crisis he perceived Italy to be undergoing. And crisis is the theme that supplies the underlying narrative to Gramsci’s writings in prison.

A Politics of the Interregnum: the Prison Notebooks 

In his Prison Notebooks Gramsci turned to the themes that had preoccupied him before his arrest – the strategy of the Communist Party, the legacy of Italy’s state formation, and the organisation of intellectuals – but he gave them a deeper, more sustained elaboration than earlier. The result, as is widely known, was the theoretical unification of those interests around the thematic of hegemony: that is, the varying capacity of a class to sustain a broad cultural and political leadership over the wider society by fashioning a consensus around its economic function. Central to that innovation, however, was a continued concern with the crisis of liberal order in Italy and the need to reason strategically from the protracted period of transition it opened up. That attention to crisis flows throughout his writings on the lessons of the Italian bourgeoisie during the Risorgimento and on Marxism as a new worldview that inherits the liberal legacy. Ironically perhaps, Gramsci’s prison notes were also enabled by the outside support of another liberal friend from Turin, the economist Piero Sraffa, who served as an advocate on Gramsci’s behalf and secured the survival of the Notebooks after his death. In what follows I review key aspects of the argument in the Notebooks. First, however, let me note how an awareness of crisis gave a distinctive rhetorical urgency to his prison writings.

For all its justified importance as the unifying theme of the Notebooks, Gramsci tended to treat hegemony as a variable principle of politics rather than a condition that was ever fully attained. His reasoning moved not from eternal ideas of political order but from an appreciation that order is always open to variation. In a note of 1930 that well describes the Italian situation after the war, Gramsci posed the dilemma that I have argued motivated much of his analysis:

If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading” but only “dominant”, exercising force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they use to believe previously. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.​[40]​

Gramsci’s reflections on hegemony build upon the premise of this ‘rift between the popular masses and ruling ideologies’ – or ‘crisis of authority’ – whose resolution would be either ‘the restoration of the old’ or ‘the possibility or necessity of creating a new culture.’​[41]​ The opportunity for revolutionary action arose not from the sheer force of will but from a strategic consideration of how a particular ‘conjunctural crisis’ opens out onto a wider ‘organic crisis’ of class power.​[42]​ In such circumstances, it was important to recognise the morbid symptoms – the distinctive signs of death – that characterised the interregnum between one order and another. Those symptoms (changes in popular belief; withdrawal of support for various ideologies; the emergence of new alliances and improbable associations, charismatic leaders and so forth)​[43]​ signalled a tear in the fabric of values and beliefs that support class hegemony and served as the initial coordinates for an alternative consensus. With the focus on crisis, Gramsci’s formulations of hegemony can be read not as a generalised sociological fact (i.e. all ruling classes must rule by hegemony) but as an emphasis on the locus of struggle across civil society. In his ‘general notion’ of the state, for example – conceived as ‘political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion’ – the accent is on debunking the liberal association of the state with government, as if governments could exist independently of consent.​[44]​ Without a wider unification of the ‘private forces’ of civil society, the political apparatus of the state cannot guarantee its own rule, and those forces can themselves be said to constitute elements of the state (in an ‘integral’ sense).​[45]​ But it was precisely the potential for disjuncture between civil society and political society – and not their harmony – that motivated Gramsci.

In light of this narrative of crisis, we can make sense of Gramsci’s reflections on Italian history and the limited formation of bourgeois hegemony prior to the state’s unification. In these extensive notes, he mined the resources available to him in prison for insights into the process of forging a ruling class. Adopting the ‘methodological criterion’ (not an axiom but a guiding principle) that a ruling class seeks to lead politically and culturally before it takes power, Gramsci set out to explore how this leadership was precisely what had not been achieved in the Italian case. He recounts the limited success of liberal parties in generating popular consent for the state among subordinate classes. The failure of the radicals in the so-called Action Party, in particular, to free themselves from the influence of the conservative Moderates by aligning with the rural peasantry was, he argues, the root political problem facing the unified state.​[46]​ The absence of a ‘Jacobin’ mentality (from the French revolutionary Jacobins who ‘strove with determination to ensure a bond between town and country’)​[47]​ resulted in the unified state being dominated by the northern bourgeoisie at the expense of the interests of the Italian South. That meant the liberal state was founded upon a ‘passive revolution’, that is, a shift in class power without a parallel change in broad popular consent.​[48]​ Taking issue with Croce’s recently published histories of Italy and Europe – which in Gramsci’s view downplay the moment of struggle and conflict when ‘one system of social relations disintegrates and falls and another arises and asserts itself’​[49]​ – he suggested that such passivity had been taken as the model for Italian liberalism, achieving social change without challenging pre-existing bases of power or mobilising new mass constituencies. In that respect, he claimed, fascism also ‘corresponds to the movement of moderate and conservative liberalism in the last century.’​[50]​ It is in light of this tradition that Gramsci again praised figures such as Gobetti for offering a more principled liberalism engaged with popular struggles.

But Italy’s history nonetheless provided Gramsci a model of political leadership of sorts. As some have indicated, he demonstrated a degree of admiration for the Moderates in their capacity to exercise a limited hegemony over other bourgeois parties. This it managed to do by exercising leadership over bourgeois intellectuals, offering both a philosophy and a ‘scholastic programme.’​[51]​ Although the Moderates only dominated other bourgeois groups, not the wider population, its example as an agent of hegemony is clearly instructive. For it is precisely the same aspiration he held for the Communist Party: namely, that it should exercise a politico-cultural influence over other intellectuals, with a similar educational orientation to help elaborate the interests of the working classes as an inclusive national project.

In his historical reflections, then, Gramsci demonstrated a simultaneous critique of and attraction to the experience of the liberal bourgeoisie. On the one hand the weaknesses of its ruling class and the underlying fault lines of its state shape the terrain upon which revolutionary strategy must be built. On the other hand, the (admittedly limited) leadership of Italy’s ‘heroic’ bourgeoisie (the Moderates) indicate crucial elements in how a new revolutionary project might be conceived. Underlying this ambivalence was, again, a model of bourgeois development (the Jacobin model) that Gramsci insisted had failed but which nevertheless offered lessons for a new hegemonic strategy. 

Gramsci’s numerous observations on historical materialism – Marxism, or the ‘philosophy of praxis’, as he put it, following Labriola – underscore further his combined continuity and break with the liberal tradition. Although Gramsci had no interest in theorising liberalism as such, his notes on Marxism highlighted the latter’s function in taking over where the former had failed.  Less an abstract theory than a practical philosophy engaged in illuminating and organising everyday life, he argued, ‘the philosophy of praxis is, indeed, the great reform of modern times, it is an intellectual and moral reform which carries out on a national scale what liberalism only managed to do for restricted strata [ceti] of the population.’​[52]​ Conceived as an ideology that encourages people to reconceptualise their material lives and not a positivistic theory of society and its intrinsic ‘laws’ of development, Marxism could function as an inclusive popular philosophy, or ‘faith’, where liberalism manifestly could not.

In making that claim, Gramsci explored Croce’s idealist philosophy and, in particular, the latter’s view that liberalism was essentially an outlook on history, a so-called ‘religion of liberty.’ That way, thought Croce, liberal ideals could be salvaged over and above the twists and turns of Italy’s political circumstances and, despite all appearances, be presented as a broad success. For Gramsci, however, it was precisely that ‘cosmopolitan’ gloss that rendered liberalism ineffectual as a civic ideal. Croce’s conception of history as the ‘story of liberty’ legitimised the Italian nation-state but it made all events part of the progress of liberty, even anti-liberal ones. Certainly Croce should be congratulated, argued Gramsci, for his ‘efforts to make idealist philosophy remain faithful to life’ – that is, in refuting positivism and all orientations towards transcendent principles grounded outside history, prioritising instead historically subjective experience  – but he could not escape a ‘speculative’ position himself.​[53]​ To subsume all events under the progressive expansion of liberty is to fail to recognise the historical particularity and transience of subjective outlooks, the way they are supplanted by others that conceive of ‘liberty’ differently.​[54]​ Croce’s speculative gloss only served to reinforce the commitment in his philosophy to the defunct liberal state.

Marxism had much that it could take from Croce’s historicist idealism, argued Gramsci. It, too, was a philosophy that could act as a unifying faith, but for the mass of the people and not simply a single class. In this respect, he claimed, ‘the philosophy of praxis is a “heresy” of the religion of liberty since it was born on the self-same terrain of modern civilisation.’​[55]​ Marxism also sprang from Hegelian, idealist roots. But unlike Croce’s religion of liberty it was a fully historicist philosophy, grounded in the material experiences of ordinary people and not a distorted gloss. This was its ‘heresy’: connecting philosophy to popular life in a way that Croce’s philosophy never could. Indeed, Marxism had its own conceptualisation of liberty – not one of individuals separated out from each other in a parliamentary state but the liberty of what throughout the Notebooks Gramsci referred to as ‘collective man.’ A conception of the individual as an integral part of a collective existence was for Gramsci a defining feature of the emergent form of Fordist industrial society. Marxism’s ‘heretical’ faith was founded upon this productive base and the collective experiences it supplied. A new articulation of liberty, in Gramsci’s view, was not one that revolved around the primacy of the individual but, rather, around the industrial unit that defined contemporary economic conditions. This was a liberty that did not stand in contrast to authority but, Gramsci continued to claim, had its own internal sense of discipline.​[56]​

Finally, we can note how Gramsci’s vision of the revolutionary party, understood as a ‘Modern Prince,’ further embodied his debt to liberalism and reflection upon its historical experience.​[57]​ Conceived as a modern agent for ‘the founding of new states or new national and social structures,’​[58]​ the party was for Gramsci both a homogenous vehicle representing unity and the repository of different class demands and experiences. On the one hand, this view recalled Lenin’s vision of a disciplined, authoritative agency with a singular voice – what Gramsci reimagined as a ‘Jacobin force’ mobilising the ‘national-popular collective will towards the realisation of a superior, total form of civilisation’​[59]​ – and, on the other, it recognised the diversity of civil society itself, staying alive to ‘spontaneous’ struggles among subaltern classes there.​[60]​ For some, this idea of revolutionary agency is uniquely democratic, at least in comparison with orthodox Leninism.​[61]​ For others, however, it retains all the dangers of authoritarianism, especially given his remarks on the need eventually to collapse state and civil society as well as promote a degree of ‘state-worship.’​[62]​ In truth, Gramsci’s idea of the party, like the idea of hegemony itself, looks both ways simultaneously: towards the prospective unity that mirrors a new state and towards the diversity and autonomy of civil society that precedes its formation. In the space between one order and the other, it was necessary to think both these moments together.

Conclusion: Gramsci in Neo-Liberal Times 

I have argued that Gramsci’s thought developed through a preoccupation with the crisis of the Italian liberal state and the imperative to mediate a period of transition from the dying order to the birth of the new. This underlying narrative partly accounts for his ambivalence towards liberalism, that is, his tendency to look beyond it by, nonetheless, dwelling on its historical experience and borrowing its terms to theorise revolution. Gramsci’s engagement with Italy’s liberal legacy helped him to historicise received Marxist categories (such as class and the state) and, in turn, that has enabled his work to be employed to comprehend the endurance of bourgeois states after World War II, underscoring in particular the hegemonic practices that sustained them while remaining committed to their eventual dissolution. But this has not been without a degree of tension in how Gramsci’s thought is recruited. In developed, post-war states it has not been so easy, as was common in the 1920s and 30s, to imagine that a civilisational break with liberal capitalism was imminent. Nor indeed was it likely that a reconstruction of states could occur around a new ‘organic’ ruling class mobilised through a disciplined revolutionary party. These hopes were difficult enough to imagine in weak states like Italy’s. In developed post-war states, Gramsci’s insights, on closer examination, seem excessively bound up with the Italian experience to supply more detailed insights.
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